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From a Misfire to an Open Future: Repetition, 
Performativity and the Promise of the Metaphor 
 
Ana Vulic 
University of Leuven 
 
This article deals with the notion of performativity through the work of J.L. Austin, Shoshana 
Felman, and, most significantly, Judith Butler. It examines the intertextual references of the work of 
the mentioned theorists mainly through the notion of promise which is used as an example, a 
metaphor, but also as an organizing principle of the performative logic of their texts. 
 
Introduction 
Recent theoretical developments in the humanities are characterized by a growing 
interdisciplinarity. The late 20th century has brought about many issues that have altered the pure 
canonical concepts of clearly delineated fields of research in philosophy, linguistics, sociology or 
psychology. As many contemporary theorists have noticed, the emergence of what Shannon Jackson 
calls the P-words, i.e. performative, performance and performativity, have strongly marked this 
interdisciplinary development, questioning many of the previously established definitions (and 
oppositions) of theory and practice, academy and politics, fiction and “reality” (Jackson, Lloyd). This 
article focuses on the texts of three theorists – John L. Austin, Shoshana Felman, and Judith Butler - 
in order to trace not only the points of convergence but also the way in which these points enabled a 
certain enchainment of ideas related to the concept of performativity. As I intend to show, these 
intertextual references revolve around the idea of repetition as their pivotal point and often rely on the 
cluster of similar underlying notions. Focusing on the notion of promise - as a figure, an example, or 
an organizing metaphor, this article traces the idea of subject outlined in the work of the 
abovementioned theorists. More precisely, it offers an insight into the evolution of the theory of 
performativity by following the idea of repeated failure, or, in Austin’s terms, misfire, in keeping 
promises. Furthermore, the article suggests the possibility of interpreting Butler’s work on 
performativity through the same figure – as a (politically) promising performative act which has 
reshaped the whole field of gender studies.  
Whereas the notion of the performative is typically associated with Austin’s work, Felman’s 
interpretation of his work has introduced psychoanalytical and deconstructive perspectives into this 
concept. In her book The Scandal of the Speaking Body (2003), Felman alludes to Austin’s long-term 
impact not only on modern linguistics and the philosophy of language, but also on the much larger 
field of critical theory. The object of her inquiry was partially to analyse the reception of Austin’s 
theory by some of his most fervent critics, such as Searle, Katz and Benveniste (99). In addition, she 
examined the criticism made by key contemporary thinkers such as Jacques Derrida. Felman, 
however, decided to approach Austin’s work on language through a literary trope inspired by Molière’s 





Don Juan, implying, thus, that this could be a more appropriate way to asses Austin’s delicate and 
ambiguous work, located at the crossroads of two different disciplines. Instead of asking what was 
Austin saying, she was much more interested in answering the question of “what Austin was doing 
with what he was saying’ (49, emphasis my own). The question itself stresses the performative 
dimension of his theory of Performative Utterances, which outlines the idea of repetition and self-
referential status of speech acts as central to the concept of performativity.  
While Austin mainly analyses the concept of promise as a speech act approaching it from the 
perspective of the failure, Felman’s usage of the expression is the most metaphorical in the 
conventional sense. In Butler’s work, however, the word is used as a specific rhetorical tool that, as I 
will argue in this article, organizes the internal dynamic of her writing, demonstrating some of its 
extraordinary metaphoric density. I have chosen to focus on Butler’s use of the word “promise” not 
only because of its metaphoric potential, but also because its meaning is permeated with all the 
inconsistencies and ambiguities of a speech act that inspired Austin’s question of How to Do Things 
with Words.1 
 
From Theory to Politics: How Did the Promise ‘Become’ Political? 
One of the crucial moments in Austin’s theory is a division of all utterances (speech acts) into 
two groups: constatives, which report on reality, and performatives, which potentially change it. 
Altogether with these notions Austin has introduced a completely new criterion in the theory of 
language – the one of felicity/infelicity – and points to the relevance of the context, i.e. precisely to 
those elements that will be the most significant for the future reading of his work by queer theorists 
(Parker and Sedgwick, Keith) . Namely, Austin has initially departed from the idea that certain speech 
acts – primarily but not exclusively the performatives – are prone to a failure or a “misfire”, referring 
therefore to their “infelicity”; not as inherent feature of the speech act itself, but rather to the 
circumstances under which it is performed. Thus, in his examples a misfire becomes the paradigm for 
“unhappy” or “infelicitous” speech acts, which, for some reason fail to produce the intended 
consequences. 
What seems at first glance a characteristic of Austin’s example of promise as one of the cases 
of the performative speech acts, is its exposure not only to a “misfire” but also to another “unhappy” 
possibility – the one of abuse. However, Austin excludes this possibility from his further research in 
order to focus on proper cases of performatives. What he examines, instead, is the intentionality of the 
promise. A person that makes a promise ought to be inspired by the intention to fulfil it. However, 
according to Austin, a false intention does not annul the previously given promise, for even a fake 
promise (if believed by the person intended, i.e. if happily performed) brings about some 
consequences. “Without effect”, in Austin’s interpretation, does not mean without consequences or 
without results: “Yet so to speak is not to say that the utterance ‘I promise that…’ is false, in the sense 





that though he states that he does, he doesn’t or that though he describes he misdescribes – 
misreports” (Austin 11).  
Interestingly, while analysing different possibilities of failure, Austin announces the problem 
of the agent’s responsibility, reducing it (if the intention is not brought into question) to a matter of 
inappropriate circumstances (9). This is even more obvious in Austin’s positing of the theatrical use of 
language as “parasitical” and considering those cases as examples of linguistic “etiolations”, in which 
the performative dimension of an utterance fails to produce the effect that it is presumed to have (22). 
Thus, the act of promising involves a certain way of thinking and acting: the person who makes a 
promise is obligated to think that what he/she promises is feasible, and that also might include 
thinking that “the promisee thinks it to be to his advantage, or [...] that it is to his advantage” (41). The 
multiple levels of implications (and expectations) including both actors in the scene of promising; 
complicate the notion of intentionality even further. Finally, Austin comes to the conclusion that the 
difference between statements and performative utterances may not be so significant, since no 
criterion seems appropriate to justify the shaky distinction between performatives and constatives.  
In Derrida’s essay “Signature, Event, Context”, which deals precisely with issues raised by 
Austin’s theory of performative utterances,  Austin’s attempts to establish an account of 
communication as an exclusively linguistic (i.e. symbolic) concept are brought into question. Instead 
of perceiving the cases of infelicity as accidental and exterior to the (performative) act, Derrida insists 
on the structural status of the inner logic of the failure. He wonders “what is a success when the 
possibility of infelicity continues to constitute its structure?” (15). (“Qu’est-ce qu’une réusssite quand 
la possibilité de l’échec continue de constitue sa structure ? ”, “Signature, événement, contexte” 385). 
In this regard, Austin’s exclusions of the “non-ordinary”, “non-serious”, or “parasitic” use of language, 
such as acting or reading a poem, actually exclude from his analysis the possibility of quoting, which is 
in Derrida’s view the very condition of any modality of speech, i.e. the condition of using language. 
Thus, Derrida engages with an attempt to radically resignify Austin’s notion of infelicity: what Austin 
was inclined to perceive as a “relatively pure” performative utterance is, according to Derrida, only 
another type of citation, though significantly different from a theatrical one, as well as from a 
quotation of a philosophical reference or a recitation of a poem. 
Considering that all social convention demands repeating in order to function, Derrida 
insisted precisely on the notion of iterability, which he perceived as a way to decontextualisation. The 
mechanism of iterability introduces certain discontinuities in the term, clefts [dehiscences] that, as 
Derrida would put it, result in distancing (or making différance) from its previous context and from 
the intended meaning. This spacing inevitably distances the speaker from the intention of his 
speaking, and therefore from the “metaphysical origins [of his doing]: the ethical and teleological 
discourse of consciousness” (“Signature Event Context” 18). (“de mêmes origines métaphysique : 
discours éthique et téléologique de la conscience”, ”Signature, événement, contexte” 389). Therefore, 
analogically to written texts, or to the functioning of any sign, performative utterance is citational in 
its structure, and due to this repetition every mark becomes structurally independent from the context 





in which it was articulated. Moreover, if the risk of failure is inherent to the speech act itself, it is 
precisely this failure that enables the very condition of their repeatability.  
Thus, the Derridian interpretation of the notion of citationality as a mimesis without end 
invokes at least two different meanings – on the one hand, without end could be taken as a temporal 
(and spatial) infinity of the possibilities of citation, and on the other, without end means without 
finality, or without possibility of subjecting it fully to the purpose. Because a word or a notion contains 
the repressed difference, which keeps coming back in the repetitive process of signification, any 
performative fails to be identical with the norms of legitimacy, distancing itself from it. 
It is precisely this gap between the meaning of a speech-act and its own reference that will 
inspire Felman’s interpretation of Austin’s work. Her arguments on the performative character of 
Austin’s work are supported by her own reading of Molière’s theatre play Don Juan, which can be 
understood as an alteration of two conceptions of language. The first conception is a cognitive one (or 
even a “constative” one, according to Austin’s terms), implying that language is an instrument to 
transmit the truth, it is the knowledge of the “real”, based on a presumption of a perfect symmetry 
between a statement and its reference. According to this view, an utterance can be true or false. The 
second conception of language that Don Juan’s character largely exploits is clearly a performative one, 
according to which saying something actually means or implies not knowing, but doing something. 
Thus, all the “misunderstandings” between Don Juan and the other characters in the piece are due to 
these two opposite linguistic conceptions. In Felman’s opinion, giving promises (and not keeping 
them) is a way of playing with the self-referential status of one’s own saying (and doing): 
Now, if the “Austin effect” is, historically, an effect of “pleasure” (an effect of seduction) 
and an effect of misreading or incomprehension, it is because the misunderstanding itself 
stems from logic – from a pre-eminently performative logic […] The history of ideas is 
thus a chain of acts that is, at the same time, a chain of errors. […] If the error is 
“excusable”, it is because this error arises, in fact, from the logic of acts. (The Scandal of 
the Speaking Body 99-100) 
Or, si l’“effet Austin” est, historiquement, un effet de “plaisir” (un effet de séduction) et un 
effet de méconnaissance ou d’incompréhension, c’est parce que le malentendu relève lui-
même d’une logique – d’une logique performative, s’il en fut. […] L’histoire des idées est 
ainsi une chaîne d’actes qui est, en même temps, une chaîne d’erreurs. […] Si l’erreur est 
“excusable”, c’est parce qu’elle relève, justement, de la logique de l’acte. (Le Scandale du 
corps parlant 196-197) 
Providing numerous examples related mainly to the etymology of the word constative, Felman 
interprets the character of Don Juan as someone who is repeatedly ‘promising the constative’. Being 
the “mythical seducer’” Don Juan makes promises that are almost exclusively promises of marriage. 
However, he repeatedly violates the institution of marriage. So, if marriage is after all (merely) a 
promise it is, then, likely to be a promise of constancy, of consequence or consequentiality, a promise 





of continuity between the moment of engagement and future acts. However, Don Juan is, as Felman 
puts it, mythically “inconstant” (The Scandal of the Speaking Body 21) (Le Scandale du corps parlant 
46). In this view, fidelity figures as the acceptance of the end, of death. Don Juan’s eroticism is, 
therefore, related to death and the boundary between life and death, which he repeatedly trespasses. 
Every failure to keep his promise motivates another promise, which is, contrary to Benveniste’s 
insistence on the uniqueness of performatives, responsible for the subversion of “being unique.” Don 
Juan subverts the authority of the first person: “The Don Juan myth is in effect the myth of the 
promise of consciousness falling flat on its face.” (The Scandal of the Speaking Body 34) (“Le mythe 
de Don Juan est, en réalité, le mythe du nez cassé de la promesse de conscience”, Le Scandale du 
corps parlant 70). Eventually, the end of the play itself enacts the same principle of repeating – the 
triple ending itself deconstructing the meaning of a closed construction: Don Juan’s death does not 
establish sense and meaning as the governing telos of the piece. The promise of the play is, therefore, 
the promise of a scandal. 
Felman returns to Austin’s idea of “misfire” departing from the Donjuanian promise of 
constancy as the structuring metaphor, of not only Austin’s work, but of the entire field of the 
philosophy of language. Moreover, Felman concludes that this repetition of failures constitutes both 
the possibility of enchainment of action within the play and the possibility of subversion - of the 
promise as well as of the authority of the (first) person who is making it. Moreover, Don Juan can be 
re-textualized through the same figure, as a text that is prone to “failure” in communicating 
unambiguously and transparently with its reader. So, according to Felman, this donjuanism of the 
Austinian meta-text consists in displacing the criterion of truth, or more precisely, in replacing it with 
the one of felicity; what he non-voluntarily succeeded in is actually providing scholarly (philosophical, 
linguistic) research with the status of performance, rather than with the status of statement: 
To say what he does with what he says; for it seems to me that the history of linguistic 
philosophy – the history of Austin’s influence and of theoretical consolidation of his 
thinking about the performative – reflects an appropriation of the constative aspect of the 
theory, but hardly at all of its performative aspect. […] the history of ideas has never 
inquired into what Austin was doing with what he was saying. (The Scandal of the 
Speaking Body 48-49) 
Dire ce qu’il fait avec ce qu’il dit : car il me semble que l’histoire de la philosophie 
linguistique – l’histoire de l’influence d’Austin et de la consécration théorique de sa 
pensée du performatif – n’a mis à contribution que l’aspect constatif de la théorie, et non 
son aspect performatif. […] l’histoire des idées ne s’est pourtant jamais posé la question : 
que faisait Austin avec ce qu’l disait ? (Le Scandale du corps parlant 99-100) 
Felman has applied the same concept – the one of repeating misfires – in her analysis of the 
reception of Austinian theory, strongly echoing Derridian notions of iterability and breaking with 
context, as well as psychoanalytical accounts of the unconscious. Therefore, she points out that a 





misfire is not an exception but the rule inherent to any utterance. In other words, the entire “history of 
ideas” can be read as a chain of misunderstandings between different theories, and the interpretations 
of Austin’s theory by Searle, Benveniste, and Derrida are to be thought of in the same terms. Thus, 
Felman posits Austin’s general speech act theory as a story with an open ending, which was hence 
misinterpreted by the critics. Austin’s work abounds in elements of incongruity, and is, hence, much 
closer to a literary than to a scholarly text, a dimension of his work which, according to Felman, has 
been symptomatically overlooked. As she argues, Austin, not unlike Don Juan and, ultimately, any 
other philosopher who allegedly deals with theoretical concepts, is promising the constative. For 
Felman, Don Juan’s acts can be perceived as the embodiment of the theory of speech acts, whereas 
Austin’s work actually reveals the donjuanism of theory. 
In her book Excitable Speech (1997), Butler refers both to Austin and Felman. She mainly refers 
to Felman’s book to stress a certain redoubling of language, thus distinguishing between what we do 
and the effect of that doing. Dealing with the question of the discursive formation of the subject, 
Butler describes a seemingly paradoxical mechanism: as subjects we are brought into being through 
linguistic (or discursive) norms, and it is precisely because this formation takes place in language, that 
we are constituted as (linguistically) vulnerable beings; language is what makes the subject’s linguistic 
i.e. symbolic existence intelligible within a certain circuit of recognition. Namely, what Butler called 
the linguistic norm is a contingent, historically modelled constellation of different social practices, 
entirely dependent on repetition. Drawing intensely on Derrida’s accounts of citationality and 
breaking with context, Butler uses the metaphor of excitable speech to point to the constitutive excess 
of the speech act in relation to its intention and the resulting possibility of political transformation. By 
virtue of being dependant on repetition, language (or the linguistic norm) is constantly open to 
resignification. Language is intrinsic to power, and vice versa, because the power of language is the 
power of the instrument through which it is exercised. According to Butler: 
[…] the speech act, as a rite of institution, is one whose contexts are never fully 
determined in advance, and that the possibility for the speech act to take on a non-
ordinary meaning, to function in contexts where it has not belonged, is precisely the 
political promise of the performative, one that positions the performative at the centre of 
a politics of hegemony, one that offers an unanticipated political future for deconstructive 
thinking. (Excitable Speech 161) 
Interestingly, Butler here uses the term promise in a significantly different way compared to her 
previous work: whereas in Gender Trouble the notion of promise was predominantly related to “the 
false promise of the ontological certitude” (Gender Trouble 27), in Excitable Speech Butler uses the 
term “promise” in order to address the open possibility of transformation, it is the promise “to 
produce the future of the language” (Excitable Speech 140). 2 Namely, tracing some lines of Austin’s 
work in which the utterance was located within a “total speech situation”, Butler stresses the possible 
reversal or the use of language in “cross-purposes” in situations in which language is intended to 
“wound”. Setting the scene for these highly undesirable forms of speech, Butler enacts a “happy” 





alternative of using the very same instrument (of speech) for resignification, emphasizing that this 
resifignication depends exactly on the existing “gap between the originating context or intention and 
the effects it produces” (Excitable Speech 14). Furthermore, Butler emphasizes: ‘This is however not 
the dead-end for the agency, but the temporal dynamic and promise of its peculiar bind’ (Excitable 
Speech 140); adding that “precisely the capacity of such terms to acquire non-ordinary meanings 
constitutes their continuing political promise” (Excitable Speech 145).  
Despite the fact that Butler does not actively make reference to Felman’s metaphor of the 
promise in Excitable Speech, Butler uses this expression to describe the possibility that results from 
the same structure. By revealing the (pre-given) subject as a grammatical fiction or seduction prior to 
entering the realm of the speakable, Butler underlines the possibility which results from the inevitable 
failure of the subject to fully conform with the terms of legitimacy. The question that this nexus of 
theoretical horizons (Austin, Felman, Butler) raises is how we can rethink the path from a misfire, i.e. 
an unfulfilled promise or a promise that is impossible to keep, towards the “political promise of the 
performative”, the promise of the open future of language. In what way is the metaphorical speech of 
these authors indicative of a change that has emerged in terms of social or critical theory, and what 
are the main features of that change?  
An attempt to reconstruct the notion of the subject in these three paradigms departing from the 
outlined fragments, allows us to see their mutual connections, as well as significant distinctions 
between them. Namely, in these shifts between analytical, psychoanalytical and poststructuralist 
paradigm, there is a noticeable switch from a sovereign subject that, in Austin’s version, feels the solid 
theoretical ground slipping away, to what Butler names in Excitable Speech the “post-sovereign” 
subject (139). While Austin considers cases in which the agent’s responsibility is questionable due to 
some contextual or circumstantial factors, Felman inaugurates the decentralized psychoanalytical 
subject, subjected to the failure in every attempt to communicate a meaning, which implies that any 
notion of agency is a structural impossibility. Finally, in the case of Butler’s “post-sovereign” subject, 
the intentionality is on the one hand completely decentred, vanished from the subject, in a move 
similar to the one that Foucauldian theory makes in decentering the power of the name by staging in 
return the name of power, but at the same time this very turn is what makes the subject’s agency 
possible. An important change of perspective enables the resignification of the notion of promise in 
these examples – from a false promise of metaphysical substantivity, which is inevitably subjected to 
failure – to a happy outcome of this failure (of the norm) to keep the promise as a promise of an open 
future of the subject’s agency. So, how does the transformed grammar of the Butlerian performative 
resignify the gap between (to use Felman’s terms) “doing” and a “thing that is done”, or between 
statement and utterance? (The Scandal of the Speaking Body 49) (“la chose faite”, Le Scandale du 
corps parlant 100) 
If Butlerian promise is paradigmatic of this misappropriation “for other purposes”, it is likely to 
assume that this misappropriation takes place, at least for one part, in her own work. One of the most 
convincing cases of a similar misappropriation, or, more generally, of resignification, which Butler 





elaborates in Bodies that Matter (1993), is implied in the trajectory the term queer has travelled 
through the history of its usage. Initially being part of those linguistic and cultural practices that 
aimed to humiliate, to embarrass, to exclude, or to repress someone into the domain of the 
marginalized other, the term queer has eventually obtained a certain affirmative re-articulation within 
academic discourse. Nevertheless, whereas Butler focused in her earlier work on the possibilities of 
subversion and transgression, in her books published after 9/11 Butler insists on the condition of 
being precarious, undone, i.e. being dispossessed as the very basis of our social life. At the same time, 
one of her key concepts – the notion of agency – becomes readable through a slightly changed 
rhetoric: whereas “subversion”, which is often (mis)understood by her readers as an open resistance 
to the discursive construction of gender and sexuality, figures even in the subtitle of Gender Trouble, 
in Undoing Gender (2004) “subversiveness” has been rearticulated in terms of an expansion of 
norms. Therefore, their opening up to more inclusive meanings enables us to perceive lives of others 
as precarious. 
How can an analysis focused on the metaphorical nature of Butler’s language help us 
understand this shift? The possibility that I would like to suggest in this article is to think of this 
change of focus in Butler’s work from performativity to precariousness in terms of its long-term 
political promise. In order to understand the nature of Butler’s engagement with theory, we should 
turn to one of the most convincing formulations related to queer theory/politics, which pertains 
precisely to its critical role. According to Butler, the future of the notion queer (but also the future of 
the theory named after it) should continue in future to enable this critical perspective on the 
discursive formation of the subject: 
If the term “queer” is to be a site of collective contestation, the point of departure for a set of 
historical reflections and futural imaginings, it will have to remain that which is, in the present, never 
fully owned, but always and only redeployed, twisted, queered from a prior usage and in the direction 
of urgent and expanding political purposes, and perhaps also yielded in favour of terms that do that 
political work more effectively. Such a yielding may well become necessary in order to accommodate – 
without domesticating – democratizing contestations that have and will redraw the contours of the 
movement in ways that can never be fully anticipated. (Bodies that Matter 228) 
Thus, already in Bodies that Matter there are some formulations that give a hint of Butler’s 
future theoretical (and political) engagement. What is more, Butler’s performative act warns against 
the conservative appropriation of the very terms of struggle for sexual minority rights and its possible 
compliance with the neo-liberal regimes of power that tend to reproduce the lines of divide between 
the Western subject and its “archaic” non-Western other (Brown 2006). What is this Butlerian 
performative promising? Perhaps we could say that it announces new critical perspectives which 
would definitely divest themselves from the binary frameworks of identity/difference as the only 
possible tool in the struggle for social change. Furthermore, the idea of a coalitional subject that Butler 
sketches in Frames of War seems to converge in many points with notions of subjectivity that have 
since recently been elaborated within the vast body of neo-Marxist scholarship (Negri/Hardt 2001, 





2006, Brown 1995). These newly emerging theoretical alliances can provide the present theoretical 
and political efforts with a different perspective on the possibilities of a definite shift from difference 
to diversity in its quest for the less violent/more inclusive forms of sociability. A related question 
would be concerned with a theory of the institutional power needed to “make” or “break promises” in 
the context of  state-sponsored violence, potentially enabling a move beyond the exclusively 
binary/oppositional framing of  current political struggles.  
The possibilities of the subject’s agency denoted in the metaphor of “the open future” are 
related to a whole scale of unanticipated effects. Butler’s theory shows that the possibilities of the 
subject’s agency, or, what is more, of its survival (taken symbolically or literally), result exactly from 
this condition of being dispossessed, which, far from being a definite, unhappy uptake of our social 
existence, opens up the unpredictable ways to some new, though always only provisional and partial 
reappropriations of the terms of legitimacy.  
 
Conclusion 
In line with the previous analysis, it might be concluded that Butler’s criticism of the 
prevailing formative patterns of sex, gender and sexuality has acted as a powerful performative that 
has reshaped the whole field of gender studies. Moreover, having enabled the change that occurred 
not only in academy, but in popular culture and activism as well, the role of Butler’s critical 
engagement itself strongly echoes Austinian notion of the performative speech act, in most compelling 
ways. Quite contrary to the usual criticisms concerning poststructuralist theories which consider these 
theories to be completely confined into the realm of language, of “logos”, and, as such, self-sufficient 
and separated from the domain of a political action, I have departed from the idea that theory not only 
describes the existing symbolic order, but also potentially changes it. The gap between doing a thing 
and having a thing done in the case of Austin’s elaboration of speech act theory, including Shoshana 
Felman’s interpretation of this work, provides an indispensable terminological and epistemological 
tool for contemporary theories of subjectivity. The relevance of Austin’s work on the performative 
speech acts in the late 20th century has shown that the span of intertextual relations is not only 
unpredictable but literally unlimited as well. These relations work by multiplying the horizons of 
mutual influences, so that the mentioned gaps remain permanently open to new inscriptions and 
interpretations.
                                                             
1
 Whereas there is a vast body of literature written on the topic of (literary) metaphor, one of the departing 
points for this article was Jacques Derrida’s essay on metaphor in which he tends to blur the distinction between 
philosophy and rhetorics, claiming that they both rely on metaphoricity of language, while philosophy pretends 
to deal with concepts and ideas (Derrida 1972, see also De Man). 
2
 “the normative promise of the humanist ideals premised on the metaphysics of substance” (Excitable Speech 
27).The promise of ontological certitude implies that this promise is conceived as a false one, or impossible to 
keep, because these ontological truths are nothing but the effect of a discourse that tends to erase itself in the 
process of constructing that very truth. 
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